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CASENOTE

EMPLOYMENT LAW-Employment-at-Will-An Employer
Cannot Avoid Its Obligation to Contribute to an
Employee-at-Will's Pension Plan by
Terminating the Employee.
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), cert
granted, -

U.S.

-,

110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).

In August, 1972, Perry McClendon, a distributor and salesman, agreed to
work for the Ingersoll-Rand Company on a commission basis for an unspecified period of time.' Ingersoll-Rand transferred McClendon to Dallas,
where he successfully developed a market for the company.2 The company
terminated McClendon four months prior to the vesting of McClendon's
pension benefits a McClendon sued Ingersoll-Rand, alleging breach of its
duty of good faith and fair dealing and wrongful discharge. 4 McClendon
claimed that Ingersoll-Rand terminated him to avoid its obligation to contribute to his pension plan. 5 The trial court rendered summary judgment for
1. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 69 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted, U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990). The "Compensation Arrangement" extended through December, 1982. This arrangement did not apply to the specific term of employment. Id.
2. Id. Ingersoll-Rand transferred McClendon from San Antonio to Dallas to develop a
market in construction equipment. McClendon's supervisor testified that McClendon performed his job satisfactorily while in Dallas. Id.
3. Id. (length of service 9 years, 8 months). McClendon was terminated on November 19,
1982 for alleged economic reasons, even though his supervisor had no complaints about his
performance. The vesting of McClendon's pension obligated Ingersoll-Rand to contribute to
his pension benefits. Id.
4. Id. at 70. McClendon's allegation of breach of good faith and fair dealing was not
addressed by the majority, because they found for McClendon on other grounds. Id. at 70 n. 1.
5. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted, U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990). Subsequent to McClendon's termination,
Ingersoll-Rand vested McClendon's pension; however, McClendon asserted that the retroactive vesting did not mitigate any bad faith conduct on part of Ingersoll-Rand. Id. at 70 n.2.
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Ingersoll-Rand.6 The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District
affirmed the trial court's decision.7 McClendon then appealed the judgment
to the Texas Supreme Court.' Held - reversed and remanded.9 An employer
cannot avoid its obligation to contribute to an employee-at-will's pension
plan by terminating the employee.'o
In the late 1800's, American courts adopted the employment-at-will doctrine because it reflected the needs and expectations of employment relationships during the industrial revolution. 1 American courts held that
employment for an unspecified period was employment-at-will.' 2 The courts

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted,
U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Houston
Court of Appeals, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Ingersoll-Rand
had wrongfully discharged McClendon to avoid its pension obligations. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985)
(employment-at-will doctrine recognized from treatise by H.G. Wood); see also Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (general history of employmentat-will doctrine); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 443-44 (N.Y. 1982) (employment-at-will found conducive to laissez-faire economics). See generally Hambright & Hambright, Labor and Employment Law, 19 TEx. TECH L. REv. 731, 775 (1988) (review of early
Texas cases involving employment-at-will doctrine); Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will:
Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 332 (1982) (employment-at-will
doctrine in response to American economics). The late nineteenth century saw the decline of
the master-servant relationship in both England and America. Murg & Sharman, Employment
at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 329, 332-35 (1982). The
industrialization of the United States in the late nineteenth century resulted in a more impersonal relationship between employer and employee. Id. at 334. As employers became less
paternalistic towards their employees, they incurred only obligations which they expressly
agreed to in the employment contract. Id. Thus, the employer under this doctrine could adapt
more readily to changing business cycles. Id. at 335; see also Feinman, The Development of the
Employment-at-Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 133 (1976) (legal formula encompassed in the employment-at-will doctrine supported establishment of industrial elite business
owners). Middle level employees are deterred from posing a threat to the owner of the business due to the owner's authority to terminate the employee at the owner's discretion. Murg
& Sharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. Rev.
329, 335 (1982); Comment, The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposalto Modify the Texas Employment
Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 667 (1984) (influence of industrial revolution and laissez-faire economics induced American courts to adopt employment-at-will doctrine in late
nineteenth century).
12. See Lord v. Goldberg, 22 P. 1126, 1128 (Cal. 1889) (permanent employment for indefinite time terminable at-will); see also Bentley v. Smith, 59 S.E. 720, 722 (Ga. Ct. App.
1907) (permanent employment held as employment-at-will); Speeder Cycle Co. v. Teeters, 48
N.E. 595, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1897) (employee can be terminated at anytime). The courts
generally hold that the employer is liable for wages earned by an employee up to the time of
termination. See Speeder Cycle Co., 48 N.E. at 596; see also Faulkner v. Des Moines Drug Co.,
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found that the concept of mutuality of obligation between employer and employee supported the employment-at-will doctrine, 3 because the doctrine allows either the employer or employee to terminate the employment
relationship at anytime, with or without cause.' 4 The freedom of either
90 N.W. 585, 587-88 (Iowa 1902) (permanent employment lasts until one party terminates
contract); Rape v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 100 So. 585, 587-88 (Miss. 1924) (employer hiring
pursuant to at-will doctrine could terminate employee at anytime); Martin v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (annual salary term does not indicate employment for
one year); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888) (employment-at-will adopted in Texas). See generallyTepker, Oklahoma'sAt-Will Rule: Heeding The
Warnings of America's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA L. REV. 373, 378 (1986) (employment-at-will outgrowth of labor market in civil society); Comment, The At- Will Doctrine:
A Proposalto Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 668 (1984)
(influence of industrial revolution and adoption of employment-at-will).
13. See Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1. App. Ct. 1978) (cause
of action would destroy mutuality of obligation in employment-at-will contract); see also
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 1932) (contract must bind
both employer and employee to prevent lack of mutuality); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
779 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. 1989XCook, J., dissenting) (mutuality of obligation in employment-atwill relationship precludes imposition of tort damages), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct.
1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-

Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proof of modification of employment-at-will creating good
cause termination requirement precludes mutual obligation of contract). But see Weiner v.

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1982) (mutuality not necessary). The court in
Weiner held that mutuality was not essential to the employment contract if the fundamental
requisite of consideration was established by the parties. See Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 444. See
generally H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 at 272

(1877) (understanding between employer and employee must be mutual); Murg & Scharman,
Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 336 (1982)
(development of doctrine supported by principles of mutuality of obligation and consideration); Tepker, Oklahoma'sAt-Will Rule: Heeding the Warnings ofAmerica's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 381-82 (1986) (mutuality of obligation defense to
harshness of doctrine).
14. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (traditional employment-at-will allowed termination without cause); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v.
Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888) (term of service depends on will of parties). East
Line was the first case in Texas to recognize the employment-at-will doctrine. East Line, 72
Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; see also United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Tull, 571 S.W.2d 551, 554
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd) (oral contract for indefinite time is employment-at-will permitting employer to terminate employee at any time); Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Dubois, 81 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ ref'd) (employer's motive
immaterial in employment-at-will contract). But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 385 (Cal. 1988) (absence of oral or written contract not presumption of at-will employment). The lack of a specific term of employment is not necessarily indicative of an employment-at-will contract. Foley, 765 P.2d at 385. Evidence of contrary intent by the parties can
overcome the presumption of employment-at-will. Id. See generally H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877); Beasley, 1983 Report of the Employment-at-Will Subcommittee, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (employment-at-will general rule in
Texas); Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposalto Modify the Texas Employment Rela-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:161

party to terminate the relationship at-will, though, does not translate into a
relationship of equal bargaining power.15 Thus, federal and state legislatures' scrutiny of this doctrine has culminated in various statutory exceptions 16 to alleviate the sometimes harsh effects on employees. 17 As a result
of the active role of the legislature, federal and state courts have deferred to
the legislature the power to adopt broad exceptions to the employment-atwill doctrine."8 However, both state and federal courts have adjudicated

tionship, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 667, 667 (1984) (defines employment-at-will doctrine); Comment, ProtectingEmployees At- Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The PublicPolicy Exception,
96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1933 (1983) (discussion of evolution of employment-at-will doctrine).
15. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (recognized stronger bargaining power on part of employer); see also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (purpose of act is to equalize ability to negotiate between employer and
employee). See generally Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66
N.C.L. Rev. 631, 647 (1988) (discussion of disparity between employees protected by unions or
special statutes and unprotected employees).
16. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988) (prohibits age discrimination in employment); see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1988) (protects employee's right to organize); Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988) (protects employee while performing jury duty); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) (protects whistle-blowers); Title VII, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1977) (employer may not discriminate in hiring on
basis of race, color, creed, or religion); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1988) (protects employee benefit plans); Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988) (provides for employee safety on job site); TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1990) (employer cannot penalize employee for
complying with valid subpoena); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5159d (Vernon Supp. 1990)
(employer must pay statutory minimum wage). See generally Hambright & Hambright, Labor
and Employment Law, 19 TEX. TECH L. REv. 731, 776 (1988) (enumerates various federal
statutes which modify employment-at-will doctrine); Comment, ProtectingEmployees at Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARnv. L. REv. 1931, 1934
(1983) (discussion of various legislative modifications to doctrine).
17. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Wis. 1983) (congress
and state legislature recognize need to diminish harshness of doctrine); see also Meredith v. C.
E. Walther, Inc., 422 So.2d 761, 762 (Ala. 1982) (employment-at-will doctrine can impose
harsh and inequitable results); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (non-union employees vulnerable under doctrine); Tepker, Oklahoma's At-Will
Rule: Heeding the WarningsofAmerica's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 373,
388 (1986) (inflexibility of doctrine and harsh effect on employee); Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 330 (1982) (emphasis on protection of employee's job security).
18. See Salanger v. U.S. Air, 560 F. Supp. 202, 205-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (modification of
employment-at-will doctrine is for legislature). The court in Salanger also asserted it was inappropriate for a federal court to modify the state's employment-at-will doctrine, when the highest state court had refused to modify. Id.; see also Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633
S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court must exercise judicial restraint); Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (employment-at-will doctrine should be modified by legislature). See generally
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various challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine, resulting in very narrow exceptions or modifications. 19
A minority of jurisdictions recognize an implied contract exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine allowing termination only with cause.2" In
these jurisdictions, employers who raise the defense of statute of frauds because there is no written employment contract may be defeated by the terms
of employment articulated in employee handbooks and manuals. 2 Another

Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REv. 631, 671 (1988)
(court should use precedent in the absence of statutes).
19. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 384-85 (Cal. 1988) (employment
agreement enforceable if not violative of legal restraints); see also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (courts recognize need to protect workers). The court
in Brockmeyer recognized workers are often wrongfully discharged under situations not considered by the legislature. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 838. Thus, the courts use contract and
tort theories to protect workers not covered by collective bargaining agreements or civil service
regulations. Id; see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (employer does not have absolute power to terminate employee); Comment, Protecting
Employees-at-Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L.

REv. 1931, 1932 (1983) (public policy exceptions for employee under employment-at-will
doctrine).
20. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980) (job
assurance in employee handbook evidence of implied contract). The court found that the employee policy statements could contain contractual rights, notwithstanding the lack of evidence
of a mutual agreement. Id. at 893. The court reasoned that an employment contract for a
definite duration had an implied agreement of termination with cause. Id. at 885. The court
Aso found that employment for a definite term had an implied contract of job security; therefore, termination for cause was not against public policy. Id. at 891; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982) (just cause requirement implied by
employee handbook terms); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). Evidence of longevity of service, commendations and promotions, lack of direct criticism, assurances of good performance, and employer's acknowledged policies regarding performance may be construed to demonstrate an implied contract not to act arbitrarily toward
the employee. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; see also Comment, Protecting Employees at
Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1935
(1983) (recognizing implied promises of tenure in employment contracts). See generally Comment, Defining PublicPolicy Torts in At-Will Dismissals,34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 154-55 (1981)
(implied contracts are initial deviation from employment-at-will doctrine).
21. See Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1989) (unilateral
contract can be created by language in employee handbook); see also Foley, 765 P.2d at 381
("indefinite" employment contract not barred by statute of frauds). See generally Comment,
Protecting Employees At- Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (1983) (implied contracts construed from terms in employee handbooks and applications). But see Joachim v. AT & T Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th
Cir. 1986) (federal court applying Texas law refused to recognize implied contract from employment handbook); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987) (oral contracts which cannot be completed within one year are unenforceable); Preis and Moyed,
Employment and Labor Law, 33 Loy. L. REV. 715, 742-43 (1987) (employee handbooks are
simply guidelines).
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exception to the employment-at-will doctrine recognized by a minority of
jurisdictions is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.22 This
exception allows the employee to recover damages for breach of the employment contract due to malicious or bad faith termination.23 Texas, however,
does not recognize implied contract2 4 or implied covenant of good faith and

22. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988) (sole remedy for
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship should be
contract damages). The court in Foley read the covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the
employment contract to protect expressed promises. Id. at 399-400; see also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Cal. 1980) (court established factor analysis approach to determine cause of action). The court in Cleary established two factors to determine
a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: 1) longevity
of service; and 2) policy which stated the employer would engage in good faith conduct. See
Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729; see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (termination not made in good faith is breach of contract); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (termination in bad faith or malice is
breach of employment contract). The court in Monge held that termination in bad faith or
malice was not in the best interest of the economic system or public good. See Monge, 316
A.2d at 551; see also Comment, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in GoodFaith, 93 HARe. L. REv. 1816, 1836 (1980) (discussion of
employer's good faith duty toward employees). But see Schmidt, Development of the Public
Policy Exception to the At- Will Doctrine, 29 Aiuz. L. REv. 295, 304 (1987) (concern that duty
of good faith and fair dealing will unduly restrict management).
23. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 398 (contractual remedies available for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (Cal. 1980) (court may allow punitive damages); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316
A.2d 549, 551-52 (N.H. 1974) (employee may seek lost wages); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512,
516 (Or. 1975) (created right to recover compensatory damages for wrongful discharge). See
generally Comment, Defining PublicPolicy Torts in At- Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153,
158-61 (1981) (brief discussion of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts).
24. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted) (employee must show written contract expressly denying
employer right to terminate at-will to prove wrongful discharge); Stiver v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (contract must
specifically state in writing employer did not have right to terminate at-will); Benoit v. Polysar
Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (language in handbooks and job application does not limit employer's rights); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (oral contracts unenforceable under statute of frauds); Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582
S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no implied contract of employment based on employee performance); cf. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (modification of employment-at-will contract
altered effect of contract). The Johnson court asserted that if the employee can prove the atwill contract was modified by actual oral agreements made by persons with authority, the
employee was no longer an employee-at-will; thus, employee and employer were subject to oral
agreement. Johnson, 690 S.W.2d at 90; see also Comment, The At- Will Doctrine:A Proposalto
Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 671 (1984) (employer
has absolute right to terminate absent specific contractual provision); Note, An Employee Dis-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss1/7

6

Jendrzey: An Employer Cannot Avoid Its Obligation to Contribute to an Emplo

1990]

CASENOTE

fair dealing2" as exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. 6
A majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, recognize public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine."' In the seminal case,
Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo.,28 the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that public policy determines what is right and just, and affects the citizens
of a state as a whole.2 9 This exception, however, is narrowly construed to
include only clear mandates of public policy, 3° not causes of action where
missed for Refusing to Commit an Illegal Act States a Cause of Action Under a Narrow Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 17 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 273, 279 (1986) (Texas
courts refuse to alter employment-at-will doctrine).
25. Turner v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 777 S.W.2d 792, 794-95 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1989, writ denied); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). But see Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 540
(Levy, J. dissenting) (court should consider good faith and fair dealing doctrine). Justice Levy,
writing for the dissent, recommends the adoption of the good faith and fair dealing doctrine to
provide a more equitable relation between employer and employee. Id.
26. See Schroeder, 769 S.W.2d at 628 (written employment contract must state no termination at employer's discretion); see also Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539
(rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (employee handbooks are simply guidelines); Watson, 582 S.W.2d at 179 (employee's receipt of raise does not constitute implied contract); Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Curtis, 245 S.W. 781, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no
writ) (hiring for indefinite time does not imply obligation by employer); Comment, An Employee Dismissed for Refusing to Commit an Illegal Act States a Cause of Action Under a Narrow Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 17 TEx. TECH L. REv. 273, 279 (1986)
(Texas courts are reluctant to make judicial exceptions to employment-at-will doctrine). See
generally Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 667, 671-75 (1984) (only expressed contractual provisions can
limit employer's right to terminate employee-at-will).
27. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985) (no
termination for refusing to violate indecent exposure statute); see also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 1981) (no termination for refusing to give false
testimony); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (no termination for not requesting
reprieve from jury duty); Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66
N.C.L. Rnv. 631, 658 (1988) (public policy exception identifies illegitimate reasons for termination); Comment, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1936-37 (1983) (most widely accepted common law
constraint is public policy exception).
28. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
29. See id. at 878 (employee terminated for refusing to give false testimony violates what
is good and just); see also Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1033 (interests of society promoted if
employer forbidden to terminate employee unjustly); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d
859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (employer bound to know public policy of state); Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 273 (W. Va. 1978) (employer may subject himself to liability for
termination that contravenes public policy). See generally Schmidt, Development of the Public
Policy Exception to the At- Will Doctrine, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 295, 300-06 (1987) (discussion of
parameters for public policy exception); Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposal To Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 667, 677-84 (1984) (public policy
difficult to define).
30. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871 (employee's discharge violates clear mandate of public pol-
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only private interests are at stake. 3 Accordingly, the public policy excep32
tion applies to employees terminated for refusing to perform illegal acts,
performing public obligations or duties,33 or exercising a legal right or
privilege.34

icy); see also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (action in
tort or contract may be based on termination in violation of clear mandate of public policy);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (employer liable for damages to employee terminated for reasons that conflict with public policy); Brockmeyer v. Dun
& Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (termination which contravenes fundamental
and well-defined public policy is wrongful).
31. See Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980) (dispute over quality of
services offered by company goes to internal management of company not public good); see
also Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512 (code of ethics serving only interests of profession is not public
policy); Campbell v. Ford Indus., 546 P.2d 141, 146 (Or. 1976) (proprietary interests of owners
of corporation not sufficient for public policy exception); Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581, 582
(Vt. 1979) (dispute over use of sick time does not involve public policy); Schmidt, Development
of the Public Policy Exception to the At- Will Doctrine, 29 ARIz. L. REv. 295, 306 (1987) (public policy does not include infringement upon personal values).
32. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1988) (employer's duty
not to terminate employee for refusing to engage in illegal activity derived from public policy
reflected in state's penal statute); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d
1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985) (absence of crime not conclusive as to exclusion of public policy exception). The court in Wagenseller held that even if there is no crime committed, to compel an
employee to perform an act which would normally be prohibited by law was a violation of
public policy. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1035; see also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (employee need not make election between job and legal
sanctions); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (wrongful termination for informing auditor of State and Federal Consumer Credit and Protection violations);
Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(forcing employee to give false testimony was improper); Tepker, Oklahoma's At-Will Rule:
Heeding The Warnings of America's Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 395
(1986) (employer cannot retaliate against employee who refuses illegal conduct); Comment,
Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983) (refusal to commit unlawful act is a public policy
exception).
33. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (termination after expressing desire
to be on jury is against public policy); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 12122 (Pa. 1978) (against public policy to terminate employee for not requesting excuse from jury
duty). See generally Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposalto Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 682-84 (1984) (discussion of public policy exceptions); Comment, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983) (general discussion of various public policy
constraints).
34. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982) (employee must establish causal link between
termination and filing of claim); see also Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill.
1978) (worker's compensation law undermined by employer's threat of discharge); Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Ind. 1973) (termination after filing worker's
compensation claim); Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L.
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In a minority of jurisdictions, state courts also recognize a public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that favors the protection of

employee pension plans.35 These courts hold that an employer cannot avoid

its obligation to contribute to an employee's pension plan by terminating the
employee prior to the vesting of pension benefits. 36 Though both the legisla-

tures and the courts recognize a public policy interest in protecting employee
pension plans,3 7 the United States Supreme Court holds that the Employee
REv. 631, 661 (1988) (worker's compensation laws example of legislative source of public
policy). The court in Frampton held that an employee must be able to exercise his rights
without fear of reprisal for the workman's compensation act to be totally effective. Frampton,
297 N.E.2d at 427. But see Santex Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (employee need not establish sole cause of termination was
worker's compensation claim). See generally Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposalto
Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 667, 678-84 (1984) (discussion of sources of and parameters of public policy exceptions).
35. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989) (employee cannot be terminated to avoid employer's pension obligation), cert. granted,- U.S. - 110 S. Ct.
1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990); see also Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 516 F. Supp. 554,
558 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (employee's monies maintained by employer shall belong and be held in
trust for employee's pension); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (strong public policy for protection of pension plans). But see Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87-91 (N.Y. 1983) (tort claim for wrongful discharge not
available to at-will employee terminated one day before pension vested). See generally Minda
& Reed, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1137,
1147-50 (1989) (emphasis on adopting an unjust dismissal statute by legislature).
36. Hovey, 516 F. Supp. at 558; see also McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71 (employer cannot
terminate employee to avoid pension obligation). But see Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 87-91 (court
refused to permit tort claim for wrongful discharge relating to pension fund).
37. See Nixon v. Celotex Corp., 693 F. Supp. 547, 555 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (unlawful to
discharge employee as means to interfere with vesting of pension); Rose v. Intelogic Trace,
Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (employee can recover under ERISA if he
demonstrates employer terminated him to avoid pension obligations); McClendon, 779 S.W.2d
at 71 (significance of pension plans evidenced by ERISA and Title 110B of Texas statutes);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (employer cannot interfere with employee's right to accumulated employment benefits). ERISA
was enacted after Congress found that employee benefit plans were increasing in number, size
and scope over the past years. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). The purpose of this legislation was to
insure that minimum standards were met in employee benefit plans. Id. Furthermore, Congress intended ERISA to provide employees with a full range of legal and equitable remedies in
both federal and state courts. H.R. Doc. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4655. The importance of this legislation is evi-

denced by the mandate that ERISA supersede any state law that relates to employee benefit
plans. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1988). The enforcement of the standards promulgated by ERISA also serve to protect the
financial soundness of the pension plan. See id. at § 1001.
An employee pension benefit or pension plan is defined as any fund, plan or program established and maintained by the employer to provide tax deferred income for retirement. Id. at §
1002(2)(A)(ii). Non-vested participants are employees with a forfeitable right under the plan.
Id. at § 1052(b)(4)(c). Upon attaining retirement age, the employee's rights to his pension
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Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") preempts any state common
law action relating to the protection of employee pension benefits.3
The Court's interpretation of ERISA's premptive powers has caused confusion in the lower federal courts concerning whether ERISA or common

benefits under this plan are generally nonforfeitable. Id. at § 1053(a). The absence of vesting,
however, is not necessarily grounds for the loss of an employee's anticipated retirement benefits. Id. at § 1001(a).
ERISA also protects an employee from any form of intimidation that is intended to limit the
employee's access to his entitled rights under the pension plan. Id. at § 1141. In addition, an
employee cannot be discharged, suspended, disciplined or discriminated against for exercising
any right promulgated under the employee pension plan. Id. at § 1140. See generally Fischel,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1105,
1106 (1988) (discussion of ERISA and employee benefit plans); Comment, ERISA Preemption
of California Tort and Bad Faith Law: What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 519, 520-33 (1988)
(discussion of congressional intent).
38. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (state
statute enacted to protect pension benefits from garnishment preempted by ERISA); see also
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987). The Dedeaux Court found that the
policies relied on by Congress would be undermined if states were also allowed to provide their
own remedies to protect pension plans. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54; see also Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) (not necessary to have defense of ERISA preemption on face of complaint). The Court in Metropolitan Life stated the touchstone for removal
from a state court to a federal court was the intent of Congress, not the obviousness of the
preemption. MetropolitanLife, 481 U.S. at 66. The Court further stated that § 502(a) of ERISA expressed Congressional intent to preempt any cause of action within the scope of this
provision. Id.; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 97 (1983) ("related to"
means "has a connection with or reference to such a plan"); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (pension plans exclusively a federal concern). The Court in
Alessi also reasoned that an indirect action by the state in the area of employee benefits could
be construed as an encroachment on federal matters. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525; see also Howard
v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (state claim arising under administration of plan benefits preempted by ERISA); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 799
(9th Cir. 1987) (ERISA supersedes state laws concerning benefit plans); Clorox Co. v. United
States Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1985) (removal permitted because denial of
employee benefits covered by ERISA). In Clorox, the employee filed a cause of action in a
California state court claiming loss of salary and employee benefits because of a wrongful
termination. Clorox, 779 F.2d at 519. There were no ERISA claims brought in the state
court. Id. The court in Clorox held that the action could be removed to a federal court,
because loss of employee benefits was under the protection of ERISA. Id. at 521; see also Ursic
v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Penn. 1983) (reasons given for employee's
termination pretextual). The employee in Ursic was terminated prior to the vesting of the
employee's full retirement benefits for allegedly stealing tools from the job site. Ursic, 556 F.
Supp. at 573-74. The court found that the deprivation of pension benefits was the actual motive for his termination. Id. at 574. The court held that this was the type of conduct ERISA
was intended to prevent. Id. at 575; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (ERISA preempts state laws relating to employee benefits). See generally Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (1984)
(employee benefit plans should be regulated by federal government).
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law actions would govern the case. 39 Generally, the lower federal courts
hold that a state claim of wrongful discharge resulting from any interference
with the vesting of a pension is preempted by ERISA.' Accordingly, the
new exception adopted by the Texas Supreme Court could be construed by
the courts as subject to preemption under ERISA.4 1
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,42 the Texas Supreme Court held an
employer cannot terminate an employee to avoid its obligation to contribute
39. Compare Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cit. 1987) (employer must intend to engage in ERISA proscribed activity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987)
and Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (need to intend to
violate ERISA), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983) and Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
384 N.E.2d 91, 94 (I1. Ct. App. 1978) (allegation of agreement for pension plan necessary to
establish cause of action under ERISA) with Donohue v. Custom Management Corp., 634 F.
Supp. 1190, 1197 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (employee's claim outside of ERISA because pension
vested) and Corum v. Farm Credit Servs., 628 F. Supp. 707, 717 (D. Minn. 1986) (ERISA not
applicable because pension vested) and King v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 593 F. Supp.
1344, 1345 (D. Mass. 1984) (critical inquiry is whether state claim relates to employment
benefit plan under ERISA). The Titsch court distinguished between the employee who is terminated to avoid the employer's pension obligation and the employee who loses his pension
benefits subsequent to a wrongful discharge based on other grounds. Titsch, 548 F. Supp. at
985. The court held that ERISA only applied to the employee terminated to avoid pension
obligations. Id.
40. Pratt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987). The Court in
Pratt held that an employee's cause of action was preempted by ERISA because interference
with employee pension benefits related to an employment benefit plan. Id.; see also Folz v.
Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1021 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (employee terminated after disclosure of chronic illness). In Folz, the plaintiff pleaded a prima facie tort case for wrongful
discharge. See Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1021. The plaintiff alleged he was terminated because his
employer did not want to pay disability benefits. Id. The court held that his state claim was
preempted under ERISA. Id.; see also Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 574 (W.D.
Penn. 1983) (ulterior motive for termination prior to vesting). See generally Hambright &
Hambright, Labor and Employment Law, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 731, 761-74 (1988) (discussion of preemptive effect of ERISA); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to
Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1313-14 (1984)
(preemption discussed).
41. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (state cause of action for
termination of disability benefits preempted by ERISA); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (state's involvement in protection of pension plans may be
encroachment on federal jurisdiction); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th
Cir. 1987) (state claim arising under administration of plan benefits preempted); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (state
statutes which relate to protection of employee benefits preempted). See generally Kilberg &
Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA
Section 512, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (1984) (federal government should regulate employee
benefit plans); Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad Faith Law: What's
Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 519, 520-21 (1988) (ERISA preemption power provides consistency
in the protection of pension plans).
42. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted, -.U.S.__, 1105 S.Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d
935 (1990).
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to the employee-at-will's pension plan.43 The McClendon decision created 44a
new exception to the longstanding employment-at-will doctrine in Texas.
The majority briefly reviewed both federal and state statutory exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine.4 5 Justice Spears, writing for the majority,
reviewed cases from other jurisdictions that recognized that public policy
exceptions could limit the authority of the employer to discharge at-will employees.' Two federal cases specifically recognized by the majority held
that public policy supports the protection of pension plans.47 Furthermore,
the majority noted that the Texas and federal legislatures have enacted statutes that specificaPy protect employee pension benefits.4" Synthesizing the
two federal cases and the Texas and federal statutes, the majority concluded
that an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was necessary to protect the integrity of employee pension plans.4 9
Justice Cook, joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justice Hecht in his
dissent, found that the primary issue to be decided was whether there was an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment-at-will

43, Id. at 71.
44, Id. at 70. Texas courts previously only recognized a wrongful termination cause of
action when an employee was terminated for refusing to commit an illegal act. Id.
45. Id. (longstanding employment-at-will doctrine had been modified by various state and
federal statutes).
46. Id. The majority acknowledged that other jurisdictions have accepted the public policy exception as a limitation to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. The majority reviewed
several cases with respect to the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
See id.; see also Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (discharge for filing
worker's compensation claim); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 426
(Ind. 1973) (termination after filing worker's compensation claim); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (bad faith termination is breach of contract); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (bad faith or malicious
termination is breach of employment contract); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (Or. 1975)
(termination for performing jury duty); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Tex. 1985) (discharge for refusing to pump bilge into ocean); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (termination for compliance with federal consumer credit
legislation).
47. See McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71; see also Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 516 F.
Supp. 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (public policy supports preservation of employee pension
plans); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing wrongful
discharge action for employee terminated to avoid pension obligation).
48. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (employer may not interfere in any way with employee's pension benefits); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Title 1l0b (Vernon 1988) (details public employee's pension benefits). This statute further protects retirement income from court
executions and local and state taxation. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Title l10b, § 21.005
(Vernon 1988). The duty of care for investment by the state of the retirement fund for public
employees is ordinary prudence with an absence of speculation. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
Title 110b, § 25.304 (Vernon 1988).
49. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71.
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contract.1° The dissent stated that although Texas courts recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts, the covenant did not apply to an employment relationship.5 1 In contrast to an
insurance relationship, Justice Cook found that in an employment relationship there is no fiduciary duty between employer and employee, no economic
benefit derived from the termination of an employee, and no unequal bargaining stance.52 The dissent stated that the capacity of either party to terminate the relationship created a mutual obligation toward each other.5 3
Justice Cook also determined that McClendon's claim for commissions on
future sales, based on an implied agreement, was precluded by an express
agreement between McClendon and Ingersoll-Rand.54 Because the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing did not apply to employment relationships,
and McClendon's pension benefits were subsequently vested, Justice Cook
concluded that McClendon did not have a cause of action for wrongful
discharge."
Justice Cook then considered the potential for preemption that may arise
out of the majority's new exception to employment-at-will and the pension
protection afforded under ERISA. 56 Justice Cook pointed out that section
514 of ERISA does not allow for duplication of effort by a state concerning
employee pension plans."' Justice Cook then admonished the court for misleading employees by offering a claim in a state court that might be pre50. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1979)(Cook, J., dissenting), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).
51. Id. at 74 (Cook, J., dissenting) (Texas recognized covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in context of insurance contracts); see also Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (policy behind covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
insurance contracts based upon unequal bargaining power between insurer and insured).
52. See McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 74 (Cook, J., dissenting) (compared insurance contracts and employment contracts).
53. Id. (Cook, J., dissenting) (mutual obligation precludes imposition of tort damages).
Justice Cook distinguished an employment relationship from an insurance relationship, stating
that employees are agents of the employer; therefore, the employee is under an obligation to
further the interests of the employer. Id The mutuality of obligation which exists in an employment at-will relationship permits either employer or employee to terminate the relationship. Id. Justice Cook, however, would not recognize a cause of action for a breach of good
faith and fair dealing or the imposition of tort damages. Id.
54. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S. W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. 1989)(Cook, J., dissenting) (express terms of agreement cannot be disavowed by implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealings), cert. granted, - U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).
55. Id. at 70 n.2 (Cook, J., dissenting) (McClendon alleged subsequent vesting did not
negate Ingersoll-Rand's original motive for terminating him).
56. Id. at 71 (Cook, J., dissenting) (dissent stated ERISA § 510 made interference with
employee pension plans unlawful).
57. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. 1989)(Cook, J., dissenting) (asserting ERISA prohibited duplication of effort in protection of pension plans), cert.
granted, -

U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 7

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:161

empted by ERISA.5 s Justice Cook also criticized the majority's failure to
determine the length of time that must elapse between termination and vesting to constitute a causal connection resulting in an action for wrongful discharge.5 9 He suggested that this failure would allow an employee to allege a
wrongful discharge claim at any point after the start of employment, thus
chilling the rights of the employer to terminate an employee. 6
Justice Gonzales, in his dissent, admonished the majority for creating a
new exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, instead of responding to
the point of error directed to the court. 61 According to Justice Gonzales,
writ of error was granted to determine whether the court of appeals erred in
not recognizing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment relationship. 62 Justice Gonzales further suggests that the majority's
failure to determine whether this cause of action arises in tort or contract, or
63
to address the issue of damages, will leave the courts in a quandary. Justice Gonzales also criticized the majority for its reliance on federal cases
interpreting New York law that New York's highest court had refused to
follow." Justice Gonzales reasoned that the majority's silence concerning
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in an employment-at-will relationship
implicitly denied the existence of this covenant in this type of relationship. 65
The Texas Supreme Court has added a caveat to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine: an employer cannot avoid its obligation to contribute
to an employee's pension plan by terminating the employee.6 Prior to the
instant case, the only exception recognized by Texas courts was an em58. Id. (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice Cook pointed out that a recent ERISA case modified the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id. Thus, the presence of only state claims may not
prevent removal to the federal courts when the claims relate to pension plans. Id.; see also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987) (express ERISA claim does not
have to be on the face of complaint); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502,
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988) (participant or beneficiary can file under ERISA). But see Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (federal question must be on
face of complaint).
59. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 73 (Cook, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice Cook was concerned that an employer's decision to
terminate an employee would come under greater scrutiny regardless of when pension vesting
would occur. Id.
61. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tex. 1989)(Gonzales, J., dissenting), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990). McClendon's
point of error concerned a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in an employment-atwill relationship. Id.
62. Id. at 75 n.1 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 75 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 76 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
65. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tex. 1989)(Gonzales, J., dissenting), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).
66. Id. at 70 (McClendon terminated by Ingersoll-Rand four months prior to vestment of
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ployee's refusal to perform an illegal act.67 The court in McClendon68 recognized that changes in employer-employee relationships, and concomitant
changes in public policy mandate modification of the employment-at-will
doctrine. 69 Statutes enacted by both state and federal legislatures reveal a
significant interest in protecting the integrity of employee pension plans.70
Accordingly, the court's pension exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is consistent with other jurisdictions' recognition of the relationship
between public policy and statutes.7 '

pension benefits). The Court in McClendon held that an employee-at-will cannot be terminated to avoid the employer's obligation to contribute to the employee's pension plan. Id.
67. See id. (employer terminated employee to avoid pension obligation); see also Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. 1985) (employer terminated employee
for refusing to illegally pump bilge of ship); cf Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 769
S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted) (no grounds for wrongful
discharge unless expressed in employment contract); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750
S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (written contract necessary
to prove employer cannot terminate employee-at-will). See generally Comment, An Employee
Dismissed for Refusing to Commit an Illegal Act States a Cause of Action Under a Narrow
Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 17 TEX. TECH L. REv. 273, 285-91 (1986)
(discussion of the public policy exception construed by the court in Sabine).
68. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d
935 (1990).
69. Id at 70 (public policy expressed in statutes); see also Sabine Pilot Sere., Inc., 687
S.W.2d at 734-35 (public policy expressed in federal and state statutes). The Sabine court
found that public policy changes to meet the evolving needs of society, and stated that these
changes were expressed in statutes. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W. 2d at 734-35; see also Petermann v.
Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (principle of law
which prevents one from injuring public or public good); Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981) (public policy included matters of justice which affected
citizens collectively).
70. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974) (employer precluded from interfering with employee benefit plan); accord TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. TITLE 110B (Vernon 1988) (protection of public employee retirement plan); see also
Pratt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987) (interference with employee pension benefits exclusively covered by ERISA); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F.
Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Penn. 1983) (termination to avoid employer's pension obligation to
employee covered by ERISA); Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D.
Tex. 1987) (employee has cause of action under ERISA against employer who interfered with
pension benefits). But see Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1985) (distinguished cases of employee termination to
avoid pension obligations and loss of pension benefits due to wrongful discharge).
71. See McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71 (protection of employee's pension plan favored by
public policy); see also Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (employer's
threat of employee dismissal interfered with intent of workman's compensation); Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Ind. 1973) (employee cannot be terminated for
filing workman's compensation claim). See generally Comment, The At- Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 683 (1984)
(courts recognize public policy exceptions inferred from statutes).
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The dissents are critical of the majority's reliance on ERISA to support
this new exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because ERISA expressly prohibits any duplication between state and federal courts with respect to the protection of pension benefits.72 The majority correctly
construed ERISA's preemptive effect as limited solely to the protection of
pension benefits.73 The majority writes that McClendon did not seek recovery of pension benefits, but sought recovery of lost future wages as a result of
his wrongful discharge. 7 However, the majority's holding is vulnerable to a
substantive attack because its support relates to the public interest in protecting the integrity of an employee's pension plan.7 5 The majority's reasoning that public policy supports the protection of employee pension plans
mirrors the policy behind ERISA.76
72. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co, 779 S.W.2d 69, 71-76 (Tex. 1989)(Cook, J.,
and Gonzales, J., dissenting), cert granted, - U.S. _ 110 S. Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935
(1990). The dissents state that the majority has adopted a cause of action which is precluded
by ERISA. Id.
73. Id. at 71; see also Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987)
(ERISA limited to violations in administration of employee benefit plans), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 979 (1987). A prima facie case is established under ERISA § 510 if the employee demonstrates the following: 1) prohibited employer conduct; 2) intent to interfere; 3) with the acquisition of rights earned by an employee. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 351; see also Titsch v. Reliance
Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ERISA does not cover loss of pension
benefits subsequent to wrongful discharge), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983); King v. James
River-Pepperel, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (D. Mass. 1984) (state claim relating to employment benefit plan must be intended by ERISA before preempted). See generally Kilberg &
Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA
Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (1984) (discussion of types of benefits which come
under ERISA).
74. See McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71 n.3 (majority acknowledged two lower federal
courts had recognized wrongful discharge pursuant to employee termination to avoid employer's pension obligation preempted under ERISA); see also Pratt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987) (interference with employee pension benefits related to
employee benefit plan); Donohue v. Custom Management Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1190, 1197
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (ERISA does not apply because employee's pension vested); Corum v. Farm
Credit Servs., 628 F. Supp. 707, 717 (D. Minn. 1986) (ERISA does not apply to vested pensions). See generally Fischell & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1988) (suggests ERISA's preemption
power is overly broad); Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad Faith Law:
What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 519, 531-33 (1988) (discussion of recent Supreme Court cases
expanding ERISA's preemptive effective to bad-faith claims).
75. See McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 72 (Cook, J., dissenting) (ERISA's preemption clause
prevented court from adjudicating claim); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
57 (1987) (state causes of action preempted by ERISA); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (indirect actions by state on employment benefits plans may encroach
on federal jurisdiction); McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 107 (3d Cir. 1986) (claim for
lost pension benefits and wages in state court preempted by ERISA).
76. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 60, 71 (Tex. 1989) (federal statute
expresses protection of integrity of pension plan), cert. granted,- U. S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1804,
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Federal case law supports Justice Cook's assertion, in his dissent, that the
federal interest in protecting the integrity of employee pension plans might
preempt this new state cause of action. 7 Furthermore, case law confirms
Justice Cook's contention that a cause of action limited to an employer's
interference with employee benefits would be preempted by ERISA. 78 Any
state action touching on pension plans would also be complicated by ERISA's ability to preempt a state claim, notwithstanding the absence of any
reference to ERISA on the face of the complaint.7 9
The majority did not address the issue raised by McClendon concerning
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'m However, Justice
Cook, in his dissent, expressly refused to recognize the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract, distinguishing employment contracts from insurance contracts."1 Justice Cook did not recog-

108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)

§ 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (employer cannot interfere with employee's right to employee
benefits); H.R. Doc. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
ADmIN. NEWS 4639, 4655 (intent of ERISA to provide employee with legal and equitable
remedies).
77. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 57 (ERISA preempts state causes of action that
affect employee benefits); see also Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525 (state statutes which affect employment benefits may be preempted by ERISA); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1564
(11 th Cir. 1987) (ERISA preempts state claims which arise under administration of plan benefits); Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1985) (action could
be removed to federal court because loss of employee benefits is covered by ERISA). See
generally Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313, 1323 (1984) (suggests ERISA preemption extends only to direct conflict between state and federal law).
78. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524 (state statutes that relate to pension benefits are preempted
by ERISA); Pratt v. Delta Air Lines, 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987) (ERISA preempts
state claims for wrongful discharge intended to deprive pension benefits); see also Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1021 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (employee allegedly discharged so employer could avoid disability payments).
79. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987) (ERISA need not be
alleged on face of complaint); see also Clorox Co. v. United States Distric Court, 779 F.2d 517,
521 (9th Cir. 1985)(absence of ERISA claim on face of complaint did not prevent removal to
federal court); Pratt v. Delta Airlines, Inc, 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987)(ERISA prevents employee's wrongful discharge claim under Maryland law relating to pension benefits);
Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988) (ERISA allowed participant or beneficiary to bring cause of action in federal court). See generally
Hambright & Hambright, Labor and Employment Law, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 731, 768
(1988) (discussion of effect of ERISA on "well-pleaded complaint" rule in Fifth Circuit).
80. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 n. 1 (Tex. 1989), cert. granted,
- U.S..., 110 S.Ct. 1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990).
81. See id. at 74 (Cook, J., dissenting) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
only applicable to insurance contracts); cf Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins., Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing equalized relationship between insured and insurer).
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nize an inequality in the employment-at-will relationship that required
protection of the employee. 2 Other jurisdictions recognize an inequality in
these relationships and recognize a need to protect workers.8 3 Additionally,
federal statutes that protect employees from discrimination and unfair labor
practices have been enacted, thus mitigating the unequal bargaining power
between employer and employee. 8"
Other jurisdictions lend support for Justice Cook's contention that the
adoption of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing would destroy the mutuality of obligation between employee and employer in an employment-atwill relationship. 5 However, Justice Cook overlooked the fact that jurisdictions that recognize a breach of this covenant limit it to incidents of bad faith
and malice.8 6 Bad faith termination of an employee is also held not to be in
the best interest of the public good.8 7 Interestingly, Justice Cook's reasoning
is similar to that of the majority and other courts that have recognized pub-

82. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 74 (Cook, J., dissenting).
83. See Meredith v. C. E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761, 762 (Ala. 1982) (employment-atwill doctrine can result in harsh or inequitable results); see also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (workers need protection from employer); Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (employer without absolute
power to terminate). See generally Comment, Protecting Employee at Will Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1932 (1983) (public policy
exceptions provide protection under employment-at-will doctrine).
84. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of age); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(aXl), (3),
(4) (1988) (protection from unfair wage and labor practices); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1988) (unorganized employee has limited negotiation ability).
85. See Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (Inl. Ct. App. 1978)
(termination for cause destroyed mutuality of obligation); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 1932) (mutuality requires that both parties be allowed to
terminate relationship at any time); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (modification of employment-at-will doctrine results in
lack of mutuality). But see Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1982)
(mutuality can be replaced by consideration). See generally Murg & Scharman, EmploymentAt- Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 336-38 (1982) (employment-at-will based on principles of mutuality of obligation and consideration).
86. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 727, 728-29 (Cal. 1980) (court held
employer breached implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after long-term employee
was terminated without cause); see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (employee terminated prior to closing of transaction to preclude
employee from receiving monetary compensation for transaction); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (termination in bad faith or malice is breach of employment contract).
87. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (employee terminated for refusing to date foreman). The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that there
must be a balance between the employer's interest in maintaining his business and the employee's interest in maintaining his employment. The employer's interest must also be balanced against the public interest in maintaining employer-employee relationships. Id.
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lic policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.""
Employment law has evolved in response to the needs of society. Therefore, gradual changes to the longstanding employment-at-will doctrine
should be anticipated to meet the changes in the employment relationship.
At first blush, both federal and state courts' zealous protection of the employee appear to be a duplication of effort. ERISA might preempt the Texas
Suireme Court's effort to allow a cause of action for the termination of employees by creating an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine relating
to pension benefits. This new exception must be narrowly construed by
Texas courts to relate only to the issue of wrongful discharge and not to
interference with the employee's pension benefits. This narrow interpretation should avoid encroachment on ERISA. Only then will innocent parties
not be misled and find their claim and forum preempted by ERISA.
Carol Jendrzey

88. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989) (public policy
exceptions necessary to meet changing needs of society), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct.
1804, 108 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1990); see also Sabine Pilot Serv. Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735
(Tex. 1985) (public policy expressed in federal and state statutes). The court in Sabine modified the employment-at-will doctrine to preclude an employer from dismissing an employee for
refusing to perform an illegal act. Sabine Pilot, 637 S.W.2d at 734. This exception was created
in response to changes in public policy which are expressed in the statutes. Id at 735; see also
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981) (public policy derived from matters of justice which affected citizens as a whole); Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l
Bhd of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (public policy defined as mandate
which prevented one from injuring public or public good).
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